A brief rant about why Russia’s much vaunted hybrid warfare capabilities failed to materialize during the February 2022 expansion of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The primary reason being that it doesn’t exist, and the secondary reason being that, to the extent it does exist, it really isn’t anything special or unique, and the tertiary reason being, it is in fact unique, insofar as the Russian security apparatus is uniquely dysfunctional at any kind of coordinated, unified campaign towards a common goal. This rant will complain about the continuing belief in the Gerasimov doctrine and explain why it’s not only not a real thing, but why that level of cross agency cooperation is pie-in-the-sky thinking for the Russian security apparatus. Drawing on case studies from Russian cyber operations (read: mishaps) both before and after the February 2022 expansion of the war in Ukraine, I’ll demonstrate that while Russian cyber capabilities shouldn’t be underestimated, neither should they be regarded as a finely tuned machine.