"The old addage holds there is an inverse relationship between usability and security. The more user-friendly the system, the less secure it is. However, recent user heuristics research may lend insight into how to design more usable, more secure operating system interfaces--independent of the underlying OS architecture, AND the gullibility of the user.
By highlighting the graphical and subtexual cues recently highlighted in popular OS interfaces, the speech will cover how users are betrayed by them, either into a state of paranoia or a false sense of security. The speech will show how both states can be used to exploit the system through the user.
As well, five guidelines for future interface design will be presented, showing how increasing the security of the interface can actually be used to increase, instead of restrict usability. While the talk is theoretical, each guidline will be applied as integrated into the design of a work-in-progress Kiosk package currently under development."