Presented at
Black Hat USA 2020 Virtual,
Aug. 5, 2020, 1:30 p.m.
(40 minutes).
<p>Data-only attacks against dynamic scripting environments have become common. Web browsers and other modern applications embed scripting engines to support interactive content. The scripting engines optimize performance via just-in-time compilation. Since applications are increasingly hardened against code-reuse attacks, adversaries are looking to achieve code execution or elevate privileges by corrupting sensitive data like the intermediate representation of optimizing JIT compilers. This has inspired numerous defenses for just-in-time compilers.</p><p>Our work demonstrates that securing JIT compilation is not sufficient. First, we present a proof-of-concept data-only attack against a recent version of Mozilla's SpiderMonkey JIT in which the attacker only corrupts heap objects to successfully issue a system call from within bytecode execution at run time. Previous work assumed that bytecode execution is safe by construction since interpreters only allow a narrow set of benign instructions and bytecode is always checked for validity before execution. We show that this does not prevent malicious code execution in practice. Second, we design a novel defense, dubbed NOJITSU to protect complex, real-world scripting engines from data-only attacks against interpreted code.</p><p>The key idea behind our defense is to enable fine-grained memory access control for individual memory regions based on their roles throughout the JavaScript lifecycle. For this we combine automated analysis, instrumentation, compartmentalization, and Intel's Memory-Protection Keys to secure SpiderMonkey against existing and newly synthesized attacks. We implement and thoroughly test our implementation using a number of real-world scenarios as well as standard benchmarks. We show that NOJITSU successfully thwarts code-reuse as well as data-only attacks against any part of the scripting engine while offering a modest run-time overhead of only 5%.</p>
Presenters:
-
Taemin Park
- PhD Student, University of California, Irvine
Taemin Park is a 5th year PhD student advised by Professor Michael Franz at University of California, Irvine. Before joining University of California, he worked three and a half years at Korea Telecom Institute of Convergence Technology for building secure authentication systems and security outsourcing services. He received a BS from Hanyang University and MS from Seoul National University.
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