Bootkits have long been used in an offensive manner by adversaries in order to maintain cold-state persistence. Micronesia is an extended bootkit to allow for self-surveillancupon a host system. The purpose of the kit is to monitor for insider-threat potential on a local machine. At current, resources invested in this problem space for anti-leak/insider-threat detection is primarily invested in exterior-host communications. They rely heavily upon heuristics and detection of anomalous traf?c movement. A notable example can be seen in various government entities where sensitive documents in high-side networks are ?ngerprinted. These ?ngerprints are then matched against low-side traf?c with hopes of taint marking against data leakage. A knowledgeable adversary however can easily render communications ineffective to being tagged. This talk proposes a bootkit solution to allow for discrete full-system monitoring and determination of insider-threat activity. The kit's name symbolizes a shift in analytical focus away from mass collection of many systems and more towards host self-determination, hence Micronesia--a collection of small islands.