Presented at
HOPE Number Nine (2012),
July 14, 2012, 3 p.m.
(60 minutes)
Last year, a few groups of independent security researchers disclosed significant vulnerabilities in SCADA systems and PLCs. This panel brings together these security researchers to discuss their findings, initial goals for doing the research, disclosure processes, and difficulties and surprises encountered. These researchers, independently and without corporate or “nation state” funding, decimated the popular belief that “security via obscurity” works to protect critical infrastructure.
Presenters:
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Tiffany Rad
Tiffany Rad is an attorney and cyber security engineer for Battelle Institute in their Center for Advanced Vehicle Engineering (CAVE) in Columbia, Maryland. She is also a part-time adjunct professor in the computer science department at the University of Southern Maine, teaching computer law, ethics, and information security.
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Teague Newman
Teague Newman is an independent information security consultant based in the Washington, DC and Reno, Nevada areas. He competed in the Netwars segment of the U.S. Cyber Challenge in 2009 and ranked highly in all rounds in which he participated. He is a penetration tester and also a training partner for Core Security Technologies. He has instructed professionals on the topics of information security and penetration testing at places like NASA, DHS, U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, DOE, and various nuclear facilities, as well as at large corporate enterprises.
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