Recount 2016: An Uninvited Security Audit of the U.S. Presidential Election

Presented at 33C3 (2016), Dec. 28, 2016, 2:30 p.m. (60 minutes)

The 2016 U.S. presidential election was preceded by unprecedented cyberattacks and produced a result that surprised many people in the U.S. and abroad. Was it hacked? To find out, we teamed up with scientists and lawyers from around the country—and a presidential candidate—to initiate the first presidential election recounts motivated primarily by e-voting security concerns. In this talk, we will explain how the recounts took place, what we learned about the integrity of the election, and what needs to change to ensure that future U.S. elections are secure.


  • J. Alex Halderman
    I’m a professor of computer science at the University of Michigan and Director of Michigan’s Center for Computer Security and Society. <a href="">My research</a> spans software security, network security, privacy, anonymity, electronic voting, and censorship resistance. I've uncovered problems in e-voting systems in the U.S., Estonia, India, and Australia. I was part of the teams that discovered the TLS <a href="">Logjam</a> and <a href="">DROWN</a> vulnerabilities. My recent projects include <a href="">Let's Encrypt, <a href="">Decoy Routing</a>, <a href="">ZMap</a>, and <a href="">Censys</a>.
  • Matt Bernhard
    I'm a second year computer science Ph.D. student at the University of Michigan with Professor Alex Halderman. My research interests focus on the broad social implications of technology and privacy, delving into computer security, cryptography, networks, usability, censorship, systems, and voting technology.


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