Presented at
32C3 (2015),
Dec. 27, 2015, 11 p.m.
(60 minutes)
<p>Last year your friend Karen joined the alternative music scene and sent you a sound track. The government is recording everything, and this year announced that alternative music is a gateway drug to terrorism (see <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/sep/25/radicalisation-kit-links-activism-and-alternative-music-scene-to-extremism">http://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/sep/25/radicalisation-kit-links-activism-and-alternative-music-scene-to-extremism</a>). Fortunately, Karen encrypted the email.</p>
<p>Fast forward to 2035. Stasi 2.0 has risen to power and has decided that, to protect society, anyone who has ever been exposed to alternative music will be sent to a „better place“. They still have a copy of Karen’s ciphertext. And here’s the really bad news: They’ve just finished building a billion-qubit quantum computer.</p>
<p>Back in 2015, large general-purpose quantum computers haven’t been built yet, but the consensus is that they will be built, and that they will allow well-funded attackers to retroactively break practically all of today's deployed public-key cryptography.
RSA will be dead.
ECC will be dead.
DSA will be dead.
„Perfect forward secrecy“, despite its name, won’t help.
</p>
<p>Fortunately, there are replacement public-key cryptosystems
that have held up very well against analysis of possible attacks,
including future quantum attacks.
This talk will take a hands-on look at the two examples
with the longest track records: namely, hash-based signatures (Merkle trees) and code-based encryption (McEliece).
</p>
<p>The talk will be given as a joint presentation by Daniel J. Bernstein and Tanja Lange.</p>
Presenters:
Links:
Similar Presentations: