Presented at
Black Hat Europe 2017,
Dec. 6, 2017, 5 p.m.
(30 minutes)
<div>GSMA is investigating, developing and standardizing an embedded SIM card with remote provisioning (that is, over-the-air installation of subscription data), called an eUICC, to improve the current mobile-phone subscription model. In this presentation, we will review remote-provisioning security mechanisms and show that these mechanisms are vulnerable to attacks that prevent network operators from providing service, in particular, we:</div><div><br></div><div>• Identify three classes of attacks by malicious insiders that prevent operators from installing subscription data on eUICC's; and</div><div>• A further attack by a network adversary that exhausts an eUICC's memory</div><div><br></div><div>These attacks arise from flaws in the specification, and we will discuss fixes that will improve security for next generation telecommunication networks. The presentation will include insights to the specification that are not yet public. It will also include GSMA's reaction to our findings. The presentation is based on research by Maxime Meyer, Elizabeth Quaglia and Ben Smyth, and it is supported by a detailed technical report, which will be released after the presentation.</div>
Presenters:
-
Maxime Meyer
- Research & Innovation Engineer, Vade Secure
Maxime Meyer is currently a research and innovation engineer at Vade Secure. He was previously a PhD candidate at ENS, France under the supervision of Professor David Naccache, and a member of the Mathematical and Algorithmic Sciences Lab of Huawei France where he was a member of the security team with Dr. Ben Smyth and Dr. Elizabeth A. Quaglia. There, he focused on studying and analyzing next generation SIMs and in particular GSMA's eUICC specification. He obtained a Master of Science in Computer Science in 2015 from Uppsala University, and holds a Master of Science in Engineering from IMT-Atlantique.
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