Presented at
Black Hat Europe 2014,
Oct. 17, 2014, 10:15 a.m.
(60 minutes)
We show that the gyroscopes found on most smart phones are sensitive to measure acoustic signals in the vicinity of the phone. Since iOS and Android require no special permissions to access the gyro, our research shows that apps and active websites that cannot access the microphone can nevertheless eavesdrop on speech in the vicinity of the phone. We have validated our findings on numerous phones and tablets with different gyro models. This is a joint work with Dan Boneh of Stanford University.
Presenters:
-
Yan Michalevsky
- Stanford University
I am a PhD student at Stanford University. I am part of the Applied Crypto Group. My advisor is Professor Dan Boneh. I graduated from the Technion, Israel Institute of Technology in 2010 with a BSc in Electrical Engineering, focusing on Digital Signal Processing and Electro-Optics.
-
Gabi Nakibly
- Rafael and the Technion
Gabi Nakibly is an adjunct lecturer at the Technion (Israel Institute of Technology) and a network security research leader at Israel's National Research & Simulation Center (part of Rafael -Advanced Defense Systems) where he is involved in the security analysis of network protocols and the secure deployment of network services. Gabi received his BSc in Information Systems Engineering (summa cum laude) and PhD in Computer Science from the Technion in 1999 and 2008, respectively.
Links:
Similar Presentations: